The global discourse on "winning hearts and minds", engages the United States, local governments and international actors in liberal peace building in conflict affected settings. In northwestern Pakistan, the Pakistani government supports this discourse by claiming to pursue a three pronged strategy based on dialogue, development and deterrence. This paper examines how peace building activities have been practiced in northwestern Pakistan in relation to development and humanitarian interventions that support community needs. Field data was gathered in Swat and Peshawar valleys between September 2010 to February 2011, through semi-structured interviews that covered peace building efforts in the form of local perceptions of development and humanitarian interventions, perspectives on development schemes, aid priorities, and the relationship between aid and security. Furthermore, the paper relies on secondary data sources such as development and humanitarian response plans, research briefs, and news events. problematizing issues. The paper concludes that the liberal peace agenda has contributed to securitization of development assistance in the region, which in turn has significantly limited the impact of development assistance to crisis affected communities.
The paper closely examines the dynamics of liberal peace building in terms of humanitarian aid operations and development activities in North Western Pakistan. Empirical evidence from the region highlights the conflations in liberal peace concerning the imbalances in policies, plans and activities in north western Pakistan. The large disconnect between liberal peace building and effective development policies and practices in north western Pakistan reflect the diverse interests of different actors, states, development and humanitarian response actors and elites, in problematizing issues. The paper concludes that the liberal peace agenda has contributed to securitization of development assistance in the region, which in turn has significantly limited the impact of development assistance to crisis affected communities. 1 was startled to observe a lack of appreciation by state authorities of the insecurities that were faced by the local populace. In spite of the gravity of the situation the state broadcaster reflected a recurring theme: they emphasized that state executives were actively promoting a development and modernization agenda that would usher in peace and prosperity for the common man. This continued even during the bleakest hours of 2007 and 2008, when suicide bombings were a common occurrence 2 . Most striking, was the obvious disconnect between the government`s inability to provide basic security and services to people, and the way the official channels were portraying, a story that was full of hope.
This paper focuses on conflict-ridden North-western Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province 3 . Located on the border with Afghanistan, it manifests the greater conflict with the Taliban. The area has been subjected to continuous violence since 9/11, which has since resulted in several military offensives by the Pakistani military. As part of its peace-building efforts to contain the fallout from the conflict, and to curb increasing extremism and militancy, Pakistan's government often claims to adopt a three-pronged strategy, based on the '3Ds'; namely dialogue, development and deterrence (APP 2009 ). The strategy is based on the need for combating militancy, and includes an enhanced development effort which intends to sway away disgruntled elements and strengthen the livelihoods of people affected by the conflict (ibid).
In the post-cold war period, it is generally assumed that societies affected by international conflicts, complex emergencies and development problems can be assisted by transitioning to a `liberal peace building agenda` (Donini 2007; Duffield 2010; Goodhand 2010; Richmond 2009 ).
For instance, liberal peace transitions in countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, and Cyprus are often cited as cases where multilateral and Western actors have successfully implemented liberal internationalism, democratization of institutions and market development (Richmond 2009 ). The aims of the liberal peace enterprise are to stabilize conflict affected countries and reduce the incidence of civil wars (Collier 2003) . It is claimed that the liberal peace agenda, as implemented by donor countries and associated international actors and institutions, promotes a scientific, technical process of peaceful governance, yet such programmes have often yielded mixed results (Richmond 2009 ). The consequences of these failures have influenced popular opinion: many now believe that pitfalls associated with the liberal peace agenda are a consequence of duplicitous intentions on the part of western donor countries (Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011) .
`The Liberal peace agenda` strongly influences the global discourse on winning hearts and minds (WHAM) (Donini 2007; Stokke 2011) . In Afghanistan and Pakistan WHAM is referred to as an instrument for turning people away from extremism by facilitating peace-building activities (such as development) and gaining the trust of communities affected by conflict (Donini 2007; Fair 2010) . In relation to North-western Pakistan, however, official development practices and their impacts on security and development of communities have yielded mixed results in their targeting of the beneficiaries of peace-building activities (Whittal 2011) . Official perspectives often differ from actual practices and what is said and what is actually implemented often differs in relation to the perspectives of local communities (Donini 2007) . Gaining an in-depth appreciation of practices of liberal peace building that impact local communities can contribute towards increased understanding of donor agendas in conflict affected regions.
This paper addresses issues related to peace-building in communities that are influenced by the liberal peace agenda at three levels, namely the local, national and international levels.
1) The local perspectives of communities: to what extent are government claims (of support for the beneficiaries of developmental and humanitarian interventions in north-western Pakistan) in fact accepted by communities themselves?
2) To explore the connections between the liberal peace agenda, as promoted by international actors, and the policies and priorities of the Pakistani government and the authorities entrusted with reconstruction and revival programmes in the area.
3) How the liberal peace agenda influences development policies in the region and whether this has contributed to securitization of development assistance in the region.
THE STUDY AREA AND METHODS
North-western Pakistan has been adversely affected by varying conflicts that have led to largescale internal displacements in the post-9/11 period. In 2004, the Pakistan Army intervened in
Waziristan and a major battle ensued, leading to thousands of military and civilian deaths (Aziz 2007) . When the Army launched full-scale military operations against the Taliban in Swat (2007-09), 2.3 million people or 11% of the total population were displaced (Cosgrave et al. 2010 ).
Most of these people have since August 2009 returned to their homes and have since then been reviving their lives and livelihoods.
This study relies upon primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered through semistructured interviews and observations; and a qualitative textual analysis. The data was collected in the Peshawar and Swat valleys, as well as Islamabad over a six-month period from September 2010 to February 2011. Key informants were identified using a snowball-cluster sampling method (table 1) . In district of Swat, respondents also consisted of IDP returnee households in villages and towns. Data from sixty respondents (n=60) was used for this paper. The respondents were chosen both to reflect differences in experience and perceptions, as well as triangulating data from multiple sources, with an aim to gauging local perceptions, since understanding the 'perception gap' between the recipients and the providers of assistance is central to gauging the impacts of policies (Donini 2007: 158) . Addressing 'perception gaps' can therefore lead to constructive engagements and promote peace-building programmes that are reality-based and retain local ownership (Donini 2007) .
[ Table 1 about here]
Undertaking field work in a conflict-affected and traditionally conservative setting such as northwestern Pakistan carries inherent risks. However, the Lead author of this study comes from the area and was able to gain the trust of communities, which enabled him to carry out interviews with the respondents in a challenging environment.
Secondary data sources for this paper include earlier studies from North-West Pakistan, reports, research briefs, news from printed and electronic media, and development policies and response plans formulated between 2006 to 2012. Policy analysis of developmental and humanitarian strategies and response plans was used to identify the goals and stated aims of various institutional actors (including national and international donors) and to compare these with perceptions of respondents at local levels.
CONCEPTUALIZING LIBERAL PEACE AND SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT
Intrastate conflicts are seen as significant obstacles to development and security, by the international community in the post-cold war period (Chandler 2010; Hoffman 2009; Raymond and Franks 2009; Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011) . In countering chronic conflicts the global development discourse on conflict-ridden zones suggests that the incidence of civil wars can be reduced through economic aid, and military and political measures (Collier 2004) . The key concern for the US-led efforts has been promoting effective transitions from conflicts to liberal peace-building (Hoffman 2009; Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011) . Arguments of state failure and concerns for the security of local populations are used as justifications for employing hard Liberal peace is traced back in history to the period, when liberal ideas entrenched in individual sovereignty, rights and equality gained hold in Europe in the seventeenth century (Fischer 2000) .
The liberal peace agenda relies on institutional reforms, such as political and economic liberalism, and state building (Richmond 2009; Stokke 2011) in conflict affected states, utilizing military, humanitarian, economic, and social interventions such as conflict management, institutional reforms, governance and development interventions (Duffield 2010 , Sabaratnam 2011 ). However, the application of this agenda during recent rebuilding efforts in conflict affected states has largely negated the principles of equality between donors and recipients that were followed during implementation of the 'Marshall Plan', in post-war Europe (Hoffman 2009; Richmond 2010) .. Liberal peace is directly linked to the global discourse on 'winning hearts and minds' '(WHAM): where actors such as the United States, Western donors, and to a certain extent the United Nations attempt to win over local populations that are supposedly under the spell of Islamic extremism (Bennett 2011 ).
Richmond ( Drawing on experiences from a number of conflict zones, the liberal peace agenda has been pursued through a combination of development interventions and the application of military resources (Richmond 2009 ). Limits to the application of military power (also referred to as 'hard power') are well known and widely accepted (Lieven 2011; Nye 2011; Richmond 2009 ).
The conservative and orthodox strands in liberal peace are manifested as hard and soft power resources, which affect the ability of donors and conflict-affected states and international actors (the WB, the UN, etc.) to achieve the desired outcomes by applying tangible and intangible resources (Stokke 2011) . Tangible resources include the use of coercion and money, while intangible resources such as patriotism, legitimacy and sensitivity to local cultures, affect the military`s effort to prevail in the long run. Intangible resources or strategies include obtaining the desired outcomes through co-option, which focuses on local institutions, values and ideas and on the legitimacy of policies pursued in conflict-affected societies. According to Richmond (2009) , lack of integration between foreign and local agendas has resulted in failure to meet the needs of local populations and led to perception gaps between peace builders and local communities. This has led to a growing perception that the form of peace building imposed by outside actors is often `alien like` and leads to excluding local subjects that have implications for peace building and success of post-conflict recovery programs (Sabaratnam 2011) .
Furthermore, several studies have shown that the inability to meet the needs of local populations is a factor that leads individuals to join militias or become insurgents or resort to black markets (Khan 2007; Richmond 2011) . Resultantly the proponents of liberal peace have struggled with the `hearts and minds` campaign to win over local populations; their efforts have been complicated by the use of military force in these regions (Donini 2007; Nye 2011; Richmond 2009 ).
The relationship between development and security seems straightforward: it relies on promoting local and international security by reducing poverty and generating well-being in conflictaffected areas (Duffield 2010) . However in relation to current practice, liberal modes of development aim to achieve international security, often at the expense of self-reliance in countries of the south (Duffield 2010; Richmond 2010) . Empirical evidence suggests that these policies and practices lead to divisive agendas that have had consequences for peace building and state building in conflict affected states (Sabaratnam 2011) .
Military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have necessitated a rethink of counter-insurgency mechanisms and have also led to overlaps between the WHAM campaign and peace-building approaches pursued by NGOs (Duffield 2010) . The development-security nexus is characterised by promises that development contributes towards international security. The development aid sector is often wholly dependent on external funding and therefore has to tailor its agenda according to the goals of its funders, who in most cases are involved in liberal peace-making (Richmond 2011) . In doing so they often become a vehicle for meeting the goals of their donors (Richmond 2011) . Consequently this contributes towards decreasing the efficiency of programs directed at achieving post-war recoveries that get undermined because of continued conflict, insecurity and under development in conflict affected settings (Sabaratnam 2011) . Moreover, since peace-building initiatives have often sought to isolate violent actors, this has contributed to increasing the violent divisions within conflict-affected societies (Duffield 2010) . As a matter of fact, effective use of aid needs to foster collective goals in conflict affected areas by increasing the cohesion of communities and ensuring that the social contract between local communities and the state remains strong (Duffield 2010) .
The Copenhagen School's securitization approach has influenced the understanding of security as a concept in contemporary international politics (Mcdonald 2008; Waever 1995) . It aims to achieve an understanding of what constitutes securitization phenomena and how security discourses are embedded in conflict contexts (Floyd, 2007) . Securitization is seen as a process of presenting and highlighting issues, in security terms that are viewed as existential threats (Buzan et al 1998) . Whenever issues of securitization are identified, either as speech acts, or as existential threats to a state, group or entity, this process is referred to as a 'securitizing move' (Buzan et al. 1998) . Such actions form the basis of securitization phenomena and are usually followed by emergency like responses (including military actions) undertaken by the securitizing actor in order to neutralize the 'existential threat` (Ibid.). Applying the securitizing approach to the north-western Pakistan case, it is seen that the securitizing actors i.e. the Pakistani and U.S.
governments undertake securitizing moves to keep insurgents such as the Taliban in check, while the referent objects are local communities of north-western Pakistan that often feel the consequences and fallouts during the course of these conflicts. The target audience that needs to be convinced for a securitization process includes the Pakistani public as well as international community.
The focus of this paper is on local perspectives of peace building and how peace-building efforts have been influenced by security concerns in the region. This does not ignore the process of securitization that is constructed by speech acts (Waever 1995) , but rather examines who in fact express the need for help during humanitarian crisis and emergency situations. In North-West
Pakistan the state authorities are careful to ground threats in public opinion before initiating largescale military operations. The US remains one of the biggest promoters of securitization in the region: it has continually prodded the Pakistani state to act decisively against militants (BBC 2010).
Failures in liberal peace building have led to increased scepticism as to whether the implementation of liberal peace can stabilize conflict-ridden zones (Goodhand 2010) . The limitations of these strategies are evident in, for example, the failure to engage the Taliban, which remains a critical issue as the expected exit of allied forces from the region (scheduled for 2014) draws closer.
Solving complex and protracted intrastate conflicts tests the limits of the liberal peace discourse, which requires an understanding of politics of development from a decentralized vantage point that is not influenced by elitist perspectives (Goodhand 2010; Richmond 2009 ).
Evidence suggests that the accommodative agendas of liberal peace (such as human security, rights, and local ownership) are rarely pursued in communities that are supposedly the beneficiaries of this agenda (Richmond 2009 ). It is the interveners' interests and agendas (i.e. the funders and promoters of liberal peace) that are safeguarded, often at the cost of the local populace (Hoffman 2009 ).
According to Richmond (2011) , the contradictions in `the liberal peace agenda` are manifested in how liberal peace builders define civil society in conflict zones as fragmented and requiring mentoring and guidance -under the influence of liberalism. This thinking adversely affects the social contracts between local communities and conflict-affected states (Hoffman 2009 ).
Richmond (2010) argues that the contradictions and divisive tendancies within liberal peace have actually contributed to failures in relation to peace making in conflict affected societies. The lack of local perspectives in particular highlight the shortcomings in liberal peace and warrant a need for exploring alternatives that are grounded in local understanding of conflict contexts (Sabaratnam 2011) .. This process of self-reflection amongst local populations has enabled local voices to gain greater salience and credibility, something which can be regarded as the onset of a post-liberal peace. Post-liberal peace seeks to unite liberal and local thinking by building upon the linkages between them in order to safeguard local needs and sensitivities (Richmond 2010 ).
Post-liberal peace is embedded in local contexts and needs, in a manner that elicits support of international actors so that they facilitate capacity building of local communities, which translate into local ownerships by allowing local communities to identify their needs themselves (Hoffman 2009 ).
LOCAL PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTIONS
There have been major humanitarian emergencies in north-western Pakistan in recent years. integrate and frame all humanitarian, recovery and developmental assistance, by aligning existing and planned interventions around a peace-building strategy; and maximising the effect of all recommended interventions by developing them specifically to benefit from synergies with existing programmes (ibid). The minimum funding required for implementing the PCNA was estimated at US$ 2.7 billion. The PCNA was supposed to be implemented from September 2010, but due to lack of follow-up this hasn't happened.
Breaking down government priorities on development
The official discourse of policy makers and executives highlights their contributions towards peace building and development. 
Local perspectives of humanitarian delivery mechanisms
The emergency responses in north- The provincial government (Provincial Disaster Management Authority -PDMA) and its line departments are the designated co-leads at the provincial levels. However, programming, 6 Governor wants socio-economic development in Fata (source:www.thenews.pk-Governor-wants-scocio-eco.html) 7 The dominant perception in interviews with the key informants was that the Government wanted to downplay the gravity and magnitude of the conflict; in renaming the PCNA the Government succeeded in taking out the word 'conflict', even though realities on the ground might seem different. However, the UN's humanitarian response to conflicts is always referred to as a `Post-conflict assessment` 
Lack of early recovery and long term development interventions
There also seems to be a lack of ownership on the part of the local authorities when undertaking relevant actions and interventions. This is reflected in the provincial government and its disaster management authority, the PDMA. The PDMA and PARRSA were headed by a District Local alternatives that are grounded in local knowledge and an understanding of contexts that are available to international actors are often ignored by the humanitarian agencies (Donini 2007) . 9 In extensive interviews at PDMA (Oct-Feb 10-11), I was informed that the P&D Department (which is the longterm development arm of the KP government) was solely responsible for development efforts. 
Creation of local dependencies
Creation of local dependencies and loss of resilience was a major theme during the interviews.
This was explained by a development and livelihood team leader as follows 11 :
Unfortunately as a result of the manner in which humanitarian responses have been carried out, people have in effect become care recipients, their resilience strategies have weakened, and [their] adaptation capacity has lowered substantially.
More than 90 percent of the respondents to this study (54 out of n=60) agreed that an excessive focus on food distribution and relief had led to dependencies. This is reflected in the allocations for the PHRP, where out of a total of US$560 million, US$195 million was allocated for food distribution, while only US$24 million was provided for livelihoods and agriculture. A PDMA official with first-hand knowledge of relief and emergency responses had this to say: However, the facts on the ground contradict this. Most of the key informants, I interviewed pointed to a lack of accountability and monitoring of projects. In particular, concerned government officials in PDMA and PARRSA revealed that there was very little opportunity to carrying out any credible monitoring. They said UN-OCHA had deliberately withheld sharing of cluster-related data such as the '3Ws' (Who, What and Where). According to them this was because of the poor feedback the UN agencies had received from NGO partners belonging to the various UN humanitarian clusters (Ahmed 2011) . The humanitarian industry is often blamed for not having adequate baselines and not conducting proper impact assessments of humanitarian interventions in Pakistan (ibid), but this is not surprising as humanitarian 12 The HC is the most senior-UN official in a country experiencing a humanitarian emergency, and is appointed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator at the onset of a humanitarian emergency.
activities are supposed be for the short term. Moreover, according to the key informants including government officials there were inadequate monitoring mechanisms to assess efficiency and address community needs through the PHRP. The flaws in the cluster response mechanism and the misplaced priorities were pointed out by a development practitioner: however, is integrated and as such requires that all of its components are endorsed and implemented in full and that a logical follow-up is undertaken and the findings incorporated and implemented in future planning (PCNA 2010) . This requires the establishment of institutional structures for implementation at all levels and the development of activity plans, timelines, etc., as well as an effective chain of command and leadership at the top levels.
The current provincial government claims to have initiated major reconstruction schemes that are adequately funded and well resourced (in comparison to the efforts of previous governments in KP`s history). Community perceptions however, have remained unchanged. According to most respondents, including humanitarian, development and aid workers, it was felt that most of these funds have either been misused or misappropriated since no large-scale schemes are visible on 13 The Chief Secretary is the administrative head of the province. the ground. Many respondents pointed out that the Pakistani development machinery and line departments had a low absorption capacity, and that this was a major impediment for development in FATA and KP as there was no body able to formulate projects for natural resource development and no entity entrusted for executing them. In this case the non-provision of security was regarded as the main impediment to development. An IDP returnee who was associated with the humanitarian sector reflected upon this aspect as follows:
PCNA 
LINKAGES WITH INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Post 9/11, development cooperation in conflict-affected areas has shifted from little considering of conflicts, to offering humanitarian relief and development aid as a peace-building tool in a conflict-sensitive manner (Richmond 2010; Stokke 2011) . Discussions of development in northwestern Pakistan are largely dominated by the view that development needs to be addressed in order to stabilize this region (PCNA 2010 , Talbot, 2008 Zones (ROZs) 16 and to initiate livelihood revival programmes in north-western Pakistan (Dawn, 2009 ). President Obama's 'Af-Pak' strategy also sought an ambitious development component.
However, political conditionalities have prevented setting out a clear and practicable partnership agenda with their Pakistani counterparts. The failure of the much-trumpeted Kerry Lugar legislation to achieve its objectives 17 is one important instance: despite the many commitments from both the Pakistani and American sides, this could not take off due to various institutional bottlenecks 18 . The shift from relief to early recovery, and then long-term development, has not materialized and has led to repeated crises and a lack of institutional capacity (Ahmed 2011 ).
There are a number of reasons for this. These include a lack of leadership vision at the government level, the heavy mandates of the UN system (UN agencies have exclusive responsibility for most donor commitments), the proliferation of national and international NGOs, misplaced priorities, the poor capacity of line departments, the lack of coordination between partners and the adverse security situation.
An assessment of US development assistance prospects for the region in the long term (Birdsall et al. 2010) recommended that development investments would require patience and insulation from short-term pressures. It emphasized that without following up on these recommendations, the United States could not expect the Kerry-Lugar legislation to positively influence peace building and development in the region, and this could adversely influence US interests and contribute to global insecurity (Birdsall et al. 2010 ). There were unresolved arguments with
Pakistan over the status of audits as well as over the illicit activities of US diplomatic and security personnel in the country (BBC 2010).
There was a great deal of distrust in the policies of United States among most of the respondents interviewed for this study. It reflects the failure in liberal peace thinking as manifested in policies by
Pakistani authorities and the United States to appreciate the needs of local communities, again linked to the disconnect between the two. The Pakistani peace-building strategies such as the PCNA are more suited to local needs and to retaining local ownership. The US has not extended significant assistance for implementing the PCNA, which is an integrated program and needs to be implemented as a whole to deliver the desired results. There has been some overlap of humanitarian goals between US and Pakistani authorities. However, in terms of longer-term development objectives there has been no meaningful relationship between the two sides.
CONFLATIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS IN LIBERAL PEACE BUILDING
In essence, the local discourses in the region are connected globally to liberal peace and neoliberal development through the 'winning of hearts and minds` discourse. This was highlighted by the DG PDMA in an interview: "This (donor assistance pledges, in most cases from the US)
is part of the commitment we got that we will be readily supported if we undertake military The exact relationship between humanitarian assistance and 'stabilization' efforts has not been finally established in north-western Pakistan (HPG 2009). Stabilization can be achieved through humanitarian programmes, but that is dependent on context-specific factors such as the scope and duration of the programme, and the overall goals of the intended beneficiaries and recipients (Goodhand 2010; HPG 2009 ). The role of the international community -with the exception of the US -particularly with reference to humanitarian support, was appreciated to some extent and regarded in a positive light by most respondents. However, external military and political objectives have emphasized stabilization of areas in north-western Pakistan that have mostly overridden purely humanitarian concerns. These approaches reveal the influence of conservative agendas on the liberal peace process (Chandler 2010) . The US continues to make demands for continued military engagement and has often tied development assistance to the need to conduct new military operations in certain areas 20 . These aspects of liberal peace (as it operates in practice) highlight the undervaluing of local social security issues, as compared to the international security concerns of promoters and effecters of liberal peace (Goodhand 2010 ). This has compromised humanitarian principles and also reflects the inherent tensions within liberal peace thinking.
Many civil society organizations (mostly funded by the U.S) have been engaged to cater to the need for humanitarian emergency responses and for carrying out public advocacy and awareness campaigns. They are often accused of violating local cultural norms and practices, something which is viewed unfavourably by most inhabitants in the region. Furthermore, there have been allegations that foreign-funded NGOs have been used for espionage purposes, most notably during the Bin Laden incident. The sincerity of emancipatory strategies is therefore increasingly being questioned from within the liberal peace agenda (Richmond 2010 ).
The emancipatory model of neo-liberal peace and development, which emphasizes people's needs, local ownership and agency, has not been given the same priority as the orthodox and conservative models (Donini 2007; Duffield 2010; Richmond 2010 (Hoffman 2010) .
A plausible understanding of the inconsistencies of liberal peace building is the dominance of conservative approaches, which are highlighted by how international actors and local governments have overwhelmingly relied on using military means to achieve their aims in conflict affected states such as Afghanistan, Iraq and North-western Pakistan (Lieven 2011; Nye 2011; Rashid 2008) . Empirical evidence suggests that the application of the liberal peace agenda has led to a merger of aid and politics in the region, even though humanitarian assistance is generally considered to be apolitical in nature (Duffield 2010) . Based on experiences in conflictaffected countries, there have been major disconnects between local understandings of peace and security and the way these are viewed by outside actors, most notably promoters of liberal peace.
The conflation and contradiction in this thinking has particularly affected longer-term development processes, which include infrastructure building programmes (Donini 2007; Orakzai 2011 ). Thus, conflict-affected societies increasingly need to rework the liberal peacebuilding agenda by recognizing local needs, rights and ownerships and addressing grievances and (where possible) building upon links with internationalists -these developments are being regarded as the onset of a 'post-liberal peace` (Richmond 2011) .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper, attempts to understand the dynamics of liberal peace building in relation to However, even if the US is one of the primary funders, it has not extended crucial support towards meeting the objectives of the PCNA. This raises unanswered questions about US intentions and its sincerity.
The disconnect between liberal peace building and effective development policies and practices in north-western Pakistan reflects the diverse interests of actors, states, elites and development and humanitarian institutions, which are unable to deal with local needs, which leads to retaining the status quo (Richmond 2010) . Even though official policy recognizes the urgency of meeting the development needs of communities in the region, it still is unable to translate these into effective interventions at the local level. Furthering the liberal peace agenda indirectly contributes to the securitization of development assistance, since it forces the Pakistani military to carry out military offensives in response to US pressure. This securitization of development also demonstrates the need to pay more attention to structural imbalances, contradictions and conflations in liberal peace. As this paper shows, the favoured response to the crises in northwest Pakistan has remained humanitarian relief, which is easy to carry out and does not require longer-term investments. However, these interventions often undermine local agency, create dependencies and lead to decreased institutional capacity. There continue to remain large gaps between the 'false promises' of development interventions promoted by the state and the actual development activities on the ground. Unless these gaps are addressed, they will continue to frustrate local communities in northwest Pakistan.
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